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9.1  Introduction 
The term “adequacy” in the title implies a comparison with a set of  stan- 
dards. In the case of U.S.  direct investment, are the data adequate to answer 
the questions that the profession and the public think it important to address? 
Since the questions deemed important may change, and indeed have changed 
over the years, an adequate data system must either change also or be exten- 
sive enough to be able to answer a variety of questions, some of which may 
only be dimly perceived at any given moment. 
Direct investment  is now  a “hot” issue. New questions have claimed the 
attention not only of the economics profession, but also of  the public at large. 
Alarmists have  interpreted  growing foreign direct  investment  in the  United 
States as endangering our control of our own future, and, along with the ac- 
cumulation  of  other  net  liabilities  to  foreigners,  as  implying  a potentially 
crushing servicing burden on future generations. Ironically, these current con- 
cerns about direct investment in the United States are just the mirror image of 
the questions debated for many years in foreign countries with respect to U.S. 
investment abroad. 
But there are more traditional questions that, in our minds, remain impor- 
tant for direct investment both in the United States and abroad. What are the 
net benefits and costs of direct investments in particular cases? What are the 
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determinants of the flow of direct investment and the real assets and liabilities 
associated with it? And there is the perennial question: What is the relation- 
ship, if any, between trade and direct investment? We will try to evaluate the 
adequacy of the present U.S. data system with respect to these questions. 
A wide range of data relating to the operations of direct investors is required 
to answer the questions posed above, certainly much more than accurate mea- 
sures of  the income and capital  flows included in the balance-of-payments 
accounts or the stock, however  defined,  that measures the direct investor’s 
stake in a particular  country  or industry.  Unlike that of most countries, the 
U.S. system of direct investment statistics does provide a wide range of data, 
at least attempting to provide the information necessary to address many im- 
portant questions. Although  we will argue that the present system can and 
should be improved in important ways, we recognize that it has long stood as 
a model for other countries. 
It is therefore disconcerting  that an aspect of  the recent public interest  in 
direct investment in the United States has been a series of attacks on the ade- 
quacy of the data system itself-in  contrast to debates about the use of spe- 
cific variables to measure particular concepts. Most of these attacks, we be- 
lieve, are wide  of the mark;  this  is especially the case with respect to the 
criticisms questioning the coverage of the samples or the accuracy of the data 
collected. 
Section 9.2 of this paper reviews the current Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) data-collection system and its history, including the definition of direct 
investment and general questions about data coverage and accuracy; a related 
question involves the adequacy of the system in delivering the data to its ulti- 
mate users. The following sections focus on a selection of issues that econo- 
mists or policymakers might wish to address using the direct investment data; 
they also deal with the adequacy of  BEA’s data for that purpose. Section 9.3 
considers the adequacy of the published direct investment position as a mea- 
sure of U.S. wealth vis-A-vis foreigners and the accuracy of the direct invest- 
ment payments data as an indicator of the servicing burden of growing foreign 
direct investment in the United States. Section 9.4 attempts to assess the trade 
implications  of  foreign  direct  investment in  the  United  States. Section 9.5 
examines our ability to measure  the  welfare  impacts of  direct  investment, 
while Section 9.6 looks at data requirements for explaining and forecasting 
direct investment flows and activities. Section 9.7 reviews our major conclu- 
sions and recommendations. 
9.2  The Present System 
Most data systems dealing with direct investment activities were designed 
to be, and are today, balance-of-payments-oriented.  On the current account 
side, they concentrate on the accurate measurement of direct investment re- 
ceipts  and  payments-dividends,  interest,  and reinvested earnings.  On the 323  Adequacy of U.S.  Direct Investment Data 
capital account side, they concentrate on the change in the ownership position 
(net worth)  of  enterprises controlled by  direct investors-the  sum of  the 
changes in owners’ equity, intercompany accounts, and reinvested earnings. 
Corresponding to this capital account flow is a net worth concept, denoted in 
the United States as the direct investment position, which is essentially the 
cumulation of previous capital flows.’ 
In the 1950s a small group of civil servants at what was then the Office of 
Business Economics (now BEA) had the inspiration to go beyond the balance- 
of-payments data in  order “to evaluate the full effects of  U.S. direct invest- 
ments, both on our domestic economy and on the economies of foreign coun- 
tries benefiting from this capital and advanced technology” (U.S. Department 
of Commerce 1960, p. 111).  Under the direction of Samuel Pizer and Frederick 
Cutler, a much more extensive system was  instituted that included detailed 
balance-sheet and income-statement data, such as sales and plant and equip- 
ment expenditures, as well as data on employment, wages, and import and 
export flows. Over the years, there has been added to this core extensive in- 
formation on parent-firm operations (for U.S., but not foreign, parents), de- 
tails on R&D expenditures and research workers, and information on  per- 
formance requirements. 
The system today consists of periodic benchmark censuses of outward and 
inward direct investments covering the data mentioned above; quarterly re- 
ports for balance-of-payment flows; semiannual reports on capital expendi- 
tures of  foreign affiliates abroad; and annual reports by  both foreign direct 
investors in the United States and U.S. direct investors abroad, covering in 
somewhat abbreviated form the same areas as the benchmark surveys. In ad- 
dition, reports are required for U.S. businesses taken over and newly estab- 
lished by foreigners. 
9.2.1  Issues of Definition, Coverage, and Accuracy 
In this subsection we will discuss issues that deal with the data system gen- 
erally; in  subsequent sections, subject-oriented in nature, we  will bring up 
issues of  coverage and accuracy as they relate to specific concepts or prob- 
lems. 
Definition of a Direct Investor 
Conceptually, a direct investor, in contrast to a portfolio investor, partici- 
pates significantly in the management of an enterprise, usually controlling it. 
Generally, it is assumed that different factors or variables motivate the actions 
of portfolio and direct investors; modem theories of direct investment tend to 
focus on “industrial organization” explanations,2 while portfolio investment 
1. BEA also adjusts the direct investment position for certain valuation changes, particularly 
2.  See Dunning (1988) for a survey. 
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is assumed to reflect mainly the flow of capital in response tc return differen- 
tials across countries. 
For the purposes of reporting requirements, BEA  currently relies on an ar- 
bitrary percentage of equity ownership by a single foreigner-10  percent of 
the  voting  shares-to  distinguish  direct from portfolio  investment .3 In  the 
past, it seemed of little importance where the percentage was set, for the ag- 
gregate magnitude of investments where the equity share was low, and control 
questionable, was small. In recent years, however, such investments seem to 
be occurring with increasing frequency. In addition, the inclusion in the totals 
for U.S.  affiliates of foreign companies of certain companies with minority 
foreign ownership, and perhaps limited foreign participation in management, 
has given a misleading impression of the extent of foreign control of the U.S. 
economy. For example, foreign participation in the U.S. chemicals industry is 
inflated by the inclusion of Du Pont; Seagrams (Canada) has a minority  but 
not controlling interest in the c~mpany.~  Similarly, the minority and not con- 
trolling  interests  of  Japanese  financial  institutions  in  Goldman-Sachs, 
Shearson-American  Express, and Paine Webber inflate the size of Japanese- 
“controlled”  assets in the United   state^.^ On the outflow side there are also 
notable minority investments, including Ford’s minority interest in Mazda and 
GM’s stake in Isuzu. 
We would suggest that BEA  continue to use the  10-percent rule to deter- 
mine reporting responsibility.6 The direct investment reports provide a more 
reliable source of information on capital flows and investment  income than 
the reporting  systems for portfolio capital flows and the indirect estimation 
methods for portfolio investment income. However, serious thought should be 
given to alternative ways of aggregating and publishing the data. Given that 
the data are computerized, it should pose no problem to produce alternative 
measures  of  the  stock of  direct  investment  (and related  measures,  such as 
sales) based on different ownership-percentage cutoffs (e.g., at 10-percent in- 
tervals, from 10 percent and above, as is now the practice, to 50 percent and 
above). This flexibility would also facilitate comparisons of data with other 
3. The reporting cutoff has not always been 10 percent; in the 1950 and 1957 censuses of direct 
investment abroad the cutoff was 25 percent, with some leeway allowed to include investments 
where control was well known even though the ownership percentage was less than 25 percent. 
For practices in other countries and a proposal for moving countries to a common set of defini- 
tions, see OECD (1983). 
4. See the May 1988 Survey of  Current Business, page 63. U.S. affiliates of foreign companies 
account for about 30 percent of both assets and sales of all U.S. chemical manufacturers. All the 
assets and sales of Du Pont and Conoco are included in this figure. 
5. See, for example, the Washington Posr of June 28, 1989, asserting that Japan had become 
the largest direct investor in the United States in 1987, based upon the total assets of these financial 
companies (and not the prorated share of Japanese investors in these companies’ assets). 
6. However, this current criterion fails to include as direct investment certain U.S. investments 
in centrally planned economies or less-developed countries that are controlled by contract, rather 
than equity ownership.  U.S.  rules on foreign ownership of  U.S.  airlines may also encourage 
investments that would not trigger reporting requirements but could involve significant influence 
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countries that use different ownership percentages as cutoffs.’ Additional  ef- 
forts by international organizations such as the IMF to harmonize definitions 
across countries are also necessary to facilitate international comparisons. 
It would also be useful to divide affiliates into those controlled by foreign 
investors,  those  where foreigners  have  noncontrolling equity interests,  and 
those that are joint ventures.  Disaggregation along these lines would require 
judgment rather than a fixed cutoff by percentage of equity. 
Coverage 
Charges have been made in recent years that BEA’s data on foreign direct 
investment in the United States seriously understate the growing foreign pres- 
ence.8 Thus,  in recent  Congressional  testimony,  Dr.  Susan J.  Tolchin,  co- 
author of Buying into America  (1988), stated: “The U.S.  is flying blind on 
foreign investment.  No one knows the full extent of foreign investment, and 
some experts believe at least 50% of all foreign investment goes unreported. 
Lax reporting requirements,  hidden ownerships, and other circumventions of 
the law-many  of them already riddled with loopholes-have  made it virtu- 
ally impossible to keep track of the flood of foreign money” (Tolchin 1988). 
After reviewing the evidence, we find nothing to support such extreme crit- 
icism. Occasionally these attacks have been based upon faulty comparisons of 
different measures of  direct investment. Measures of the total assets of  U.S. 
affiliates of foreigners differ substantially from measures of the amounts in- 
vested by foreigners to acquire or establish U.S. affiliates, and these amounts 
differ again from the direct investment capital flows and the cumulation of 
these capital flows into the international investment position. Moreover, some 
BEA data attribute  investments  to the country  of residence of  the ultimate 
owner, while other data are presented on the basis of  residence of the direct 
owner. Perhaps BEA should make a greater effort to educate the public on the 
differences between various data series and the reasons for collecting data on 
different bases. 
BEA data  would  understate  the size of  direct investment  if  a significant 
number of large investors failed to report. However, BEA devotes substantial 
resources to monitoring publicly available information for the names of new 
reporters.  Undoubtedly  some  U. S. companies  making  direct  investments 
abroad are missed, as are some foreign investments in the United States. This 
is more likely in the case of small investments or private transactions (SEC 
regulations require registration of purchases of  5 percent or more of the equity 
of publicly traded U.S. companies). If there are any problems, they are prob- 
ably in real estate, where small investments are common. In addition, much 
7. See Vukmanic, Czinkota, and Ricks (1985) for an excellent discussion of the direct invest- 
ment definitions, practices,  and inadequacies for other countries. Robert E. Lipsey’s comment 
(1985) on that paper is very useful. See also OECD (1983). 
8. See, for example, Congressional Economic Leadership Institute (1989, p.  33) or Tolchin 
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foreign investment in U.S.  real estate falls between the cracks of  various re- 
porting requirements; no direct investment reports are required on residential 
real estate for personal use or on real estate investment through limited part- 
nerships (since direct investment is defined as control of  10 percent of  the 
voting equity in a ~ompany).~ 
If additional funds were available, BEA could devote additional resources 
to ferreting out direct investors who currently do not report. Since these are 
likely to be small investors, they are unlikely to substantially alter the overall 
picture of U.S. investment abroad or foreign investment in the United States. 
Moreover,  except  for certain  real  estate transactions, as  discussed above, 
investors are already legally required to report; adding additional legal re- 
quirements to report would do nothing to improve coverage. 
Accuracy 
Despite the legal obligations to report,  the accuracy of  the responses to 
BEA direct investment surveys depends primarily on voluntary compliance 
with the law. Historically, BEA has not conducted detailed audits of the books 
of direct investors, nor does it currently have the staff to do this. Since BEA 
surveys are confidential and are not used for tax purposes, there is no obvious 
incentive for firms to misrepresent data. However, firms pressed by competi- 
tive pressures to limit costs or firms recently acquired through takeovers may 
not devote sufficient resources to ensure accurate reporting. Late reporting by 
foreign investors in the United States has become a serious problem, produc- 
ing, for example, large revisions in  the data for the fourth quarter of  1988. 
This problem, it must be said, has been exacerbated by the lack of  concern 
shown for the quality of economic data in the higher echelons of the executive 
branch in recent years, particularly by the Office of Management and Budget. 
Excessive attention by OMB to the laudable goal of reducing the “paperwork 
burden,” with very little attention to its traditional role of assuring statistical 
quality, has been an invitation to a significant minority of businesses to resist 
providing accurate and timely data. 
The accuracy of  data that firms provide is likely to be reasonably high for 
information that home offices collect in any case for their own purposes, such 
as parent and affiliate balance-sheet or income-statement data. However, it is 
uncertain whether wholly-owned U. S. affiliates of  foreigners report as in- 
structed using U.S. generally accepted accounting practices rather than U.S. 
tax or foreign accounting practices. In addition, firms more often may be lax 
about the accuracy of  data that they do not collect as a matter of  course. A 
case in point is the extremely low quality of data, mandated in the 1982 cen- 
9. In theory, the Treasury International Capital S-reports currently include data on limited part- 
nerships; in practice, only participations traded on exchanges are reported (aggregated with other 
investments).  Planned clarification of  the TIC-S reporting instructions in July  1990 may help 
some, but since many real estate partnerships are formed without the participation of  current S- 
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sus, on investment incentives given by  foreign governments to U.S.-owned 
subsidiaries abroad.’O  There also have been problems  with the data on em- 
ployment and employee compensation. Devoting additional BEA resources to 
monitoring the accuracy of direct investment reports would normally be the 
answer to such problems,  but this, sad as it is to say, would probably not be 
worthwhile unless there is a political consensus to force the private sector to 
devote additional resources to eliminating inadequacies in statistical reports. 
Some insight into the accuracy of U.S.  data on direct investment might be 
gained by  comparison  with other countries.  Unfortunately,  since the United 
States is virtually the only country that collects and publishes extensive data 
on the operations of  affiliates, the only comparisons possible are of balance- 
of-payments  data on capital flows, receipts,  and payments.  And even here, 
many countries  do not adhere to international  standards established by  the 
IMF. Only a few major countries collect information on reinvested earnings; 
treatment of short-term accounts receivable and payable differ; and the divi- 
sion between portfolio and direct investment is not uniformly set at 10 per- 
cent. 
Comparisons of U.S. data on the direct investment position of Canada and 
Japan in the United  States with data from these countries have been used to 
support the assertion that the U.S.  data are inadequate.  (See Congressional 
Economic Leadership Institute 1989, p. 33.) However, the United States and 
Canada  regularly  meet  to reconcile  international  transactions  data.  Based 
upon these annual meetings, there is no evidence that Canadian direct invest- 
ment in  the  United  States is systematically  underreported  in the  U.S.  data 
(when common definitions are used). Moreover, the published Canadian and 
Japanese data on direct investment positions in the United States include in- 
vestments made through third countries, while the U.S. data do not. For Can- 
ada, in particular, investments in the United States made through subsidiaries 
in the Netherlands are very large. In conclusion, international attempts to en- 
courage common definitions probably should be supported.  Until that is ac- 
complished, efforts at bilateral reconciliation will remain very difficult. 
The Delivery System: Conjdentiality, Suppressed Data, and Access by 
Researchers 
The necessary confidentiality  of  the underlying parent and affiliate reports 
has  been  a  continuing  problem  in  delivering  the  BEA data  to  its  ultimate 
users. When consulting data presented by country and industry in published 
tables, one all too often finds a “D”, indicating that the data point has been 
suppressed because the cell is, according to the statistical tests used by BEA, 
“dominated” by three or fewer firms.  II This confidentiality problem also im- 
10. See U.S. Department of Commerce (1985, appendix, p. 4 of  form BE-lob, Report for 
1  1. For an example, see Table 1II.T 3 of  the  1982 census of direct investment abroad (U.S. 
Foreign Alliliate). 
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plies that it is frequently impossible to publish data at the disaggregated indus- 
try level.  Users would be helped  if  data ranges could be substituted for the 
present “D”s. 
Given the suppression problem and the additional fact that the existing time 
series for much operating data are short (e.g., sales), it is often tempting for 
researchers to try to work with the underlying,  microeconomic  affiliate data. 
For over twenty years BEA has cooperated with government and outside re- 
searchers, but because of the confidentiality problems and costs, research ac- 
tivity of this kind has been very limited.12 
Because of the confidentiality requirement, the delivery system will prob- 
ably always be bedeviled with problems. However, steps have been taken to 
improve the situation, and more could be taken. BEA has greatly expanded 
the range of data it now publishes  in census tables and annual reports; some 
of  the latter present  a much richer set of  data than appear in the Survey  of 
Current Business. The aggregated data are also available on machine-readable 
diskettes. 
The use of the microeconomic affiliate data, under proper confidentiality 
safeguards, has been encouraged by BEA through a program that has existed 
since the early  1970s. BEA personnel  perform  statistical  work  for outside 
researchers  and, in some instances, researchers are permitted to be taken “in 
house” as consultants. Unfortunately, after an auspicious start, increasing re- 
sponsibilities combined with tight budgets have made it very difficult for BEA 
personnel to participate in this program, even when outside researchers have 
the funds to pay for their services. 
9.3  Measures of the U.S. Investment Position and Servicing Burden 
According to BEA data, the United States shifted from a net positive inter- 
national investment position of $141 billion at the end of  1981 to a negative 
position of  $533 billion at the end of  1988. Concerns have been raised about 
the willingness of investors to continue to invest in the United States at current 
interest  and exchange rates  and about the servicing  burden implied  by  this 
growing  negative  position. Because of  these concerns, increasing  attention 
has been focused on the accuracy of the data on the net international invest- 
ment position and, in particular, on the use of book value in the measurement 
of the direct investment position. BEA estimates the market value of U.S. and 
foreign holdings of  portfolio investments, but makes no attempt to estimate 
the market value of direct investments.  However, in an inflationary environ- 
ment, book value is likely to seriously underestimate the market value of old 
investments. Because foreign direct  investment  in the United  States  is, on 
average,  more recent than  U.S. direct investment  abroad, the  use  of  book 
value undoubtedly understates the net U.S. direct investment position. 
12. However,  some interesting  work has come out of  such cooperation:  see, for example, 
Courtney and Leipziger (1975). Lipsey and Weiss (1984), Severn (1972). and Stevens (1969). 329  Adequacy of  U.S. Direct Investment Data 
Historical  cost is the accepted  basis for company  accounting records, so 
that, with few exceptions, book values are the only valuations readily avail- 
able to companies required to report in BEA surveys. Moreover, most large 
affiliates  of  U.S.  companies abroad and foreign  companies in  the  United 
States are fully owned, so that direct assessment of market value through the 
prices  of  shares traded  on public  exchanges is not possible.  Therefore, at- 
tempts to measure the current market value of  direct investment must rely on 
indirect estimation methods, which undoubtedly are subject to large errors. 
An estimate of  the current value of  direct  investment is employed in the 
forecasting  model  of  the U.S.  current account used at the Federal  Reserve 
Board (the “USIT model”). Direct investment receipts and payments, and im- 
plicitly the current value of  direct investment assets, are assumed to increase 
with the general price level and vary in dollar terms with the weighted average 
exchange rate.I3 Under these assumptions, the value of U.S. direct investment 
abroad was about $750 billion at the end of 1988, while foreign direct invest- 
ment in the United States was about $450 billion. (The book values were $327 
billion and $329 billion respectively.) 
Two recent papers have provided somewhat higher estimates than the USIT 
model for the net U.S. direct investment position at the end of  1987 (Eisner 
and Pieper  1988, Ulan  and Dewald 1989). Both  studies essentially  use the 
methodology described above: starting with a base period, they inflate by sub- 
sequent  price changes and add new  investments.  In  contrast  to the USIT 
model estimates, they start with an earlier base period, disaggregate by coun- 
try (instead of using weighted averages), and do not use a general price index. 
Instead they produce two estimates, an estimate of  market value using stock 
market prices and an estimate of  replacement cost using implicit deflators for 
gross fixed capital formation.I4  In addition, Ulan and Dewald produce a third 
estimate based on the capitalization of direct investment income.  l5 
At best, all of these estimates are crude approximations.  Inflating earlier 
investments by  some price index fails to take into account investment mis- 
takes (e.g., the value of Volkswagen’s closed U.S. plant is its resale value, not 
its replacement cost). Also, not all direct investment capital flows are used to 
finance  plant  and equipment expenditures; accurate  replacement costs can 
only be calculated by examining the balance sheets of affiliates (not the direct 
investment position)  and adjusting each component (e.g., plant, equipment, 
inventories,  accounts receivable, etc.) to current value. l6 In addition, none of 
these approaches adjusts for the fact that depreciation charges may be inade- 
13. See Stekler (1979). Starting at  a base period, the investment position is inflated in each 
subsequent period by a price index (adjusted for exchange-rate changes in the case of investment 
abroad), and new investment is added to create an “adjusted’ position series. 
14. Stock market price increases reflect, in part, reinvested earnings. Eisner and Pieper adjust 
their stock indexes to exclude the effect of reinvested earnings in order to prevent double counting. 
(Reinvested earnings are also included in the capital flows data.) Ulan and Dewald do not. 
15. The discount rate used was a three-year moving geometric average of  the earningiprice 
ratio for stocks in the Standard and Poor 500-stock index. 
16. Walther Lederer has done some preliminary work along these lines. 330  Lois E. Stekler and Guy V.  G.  Stevens 
quate to cover replacement costs when there have been  substantial price or 
exchange-rate changes, or the fact that new capital, financed by depreciation 
charges, may be far more productive. 
Ulan and Dewald’s third (and much higher) estimate, based on capitalized 
earnings, appears to be rather implausible. For example, the estimated value 
of  foreign direct investment in the United States at the end of  1987 is only 
$162 billion, compared with a book value of $262 billion. It is the case that 
several major investments by foreigners in the United States have not proved 
profitable (e.g., Volkswagen’s auto production facilities, Midland Bank’s in- 
vestment in Crocker, and Campeau’s retail store operations). However, it is 
hard to believe that foreign investments in the U.S. have lost, on average, 40 
percent of their value in recent years. 
In conclusion, the U.S. net direct investment position at the end of  1987 
was probably closer to the $350 to $415 billion range estimated by the USIT 
model and by Eisner and Pieper than to the $36 billion published by  BEA. 
Since direct investment inflows in  1988 were about $40 billion larger than 
outflows, the net position at the end of  1988 was probably about $300 to $400 
billion. 
While it is possible to make rough estimates of the market value of direct 
investment by the methods described above, each method has advantages and 
disadvantages, and no one method is clearly superior. The choice between 
them depends,  in part,  on the use envisaged for the data. For example,  it 
would be circular to compare rates of return on U.S. direct investment abroad 
and foreign direct investment in the United States using a measure of  direct 
investment assets derived by capitalizing earnings; the answer would be what- 
ever you assumed in capitalizing earnings. In any case, BEA should continue 
to collect and publish numbers based on book value. In addition, BEA could 
explore alternative measures and indicate a range of estimates for value. How- 
ever, given the shortage of resources available to BEA, and given the serious 
difficulties presented by the large cumulative statistical discrepancy in recent 
years, it is not clear that accurate measurement of the net investment position 
is possible, or that efforts to measure more precisely the market value of the 
direct investment position deserve high priority. 
Under these circumstances, the value of  publishing the overall U.S.  net 
international investment position becomes questionable. Moreover, in assess- 
ing the creditworthiness of  the United States, focus should probably be  di- 
rected, not at the investment position, but at net investment income payments 
(see Stekler and Helkie  1989). In  this context, the accuracy of  the data on 
direct investment receipts and payments is crucial. Foreign direct investors in 
the United States appear to earn a very low rate of return on their investments, 
far below the rate earned by U.S. direct investors abroad, even when attempts 
are made to adjust the position to market value.” Whether this differential is 
17. Using direct investment receipts and payments as reported in the balance-of-payments ac- 
counts and estimates of the value of the position from the USIT model, the real rate of  return on 331  Adequacy of  U.S. Direct Investment Data 
accurate (whether accounting conventions accurately measure economic re- 
turns) and whether it is likely to persist have important implications for future 
direct investment receipts and payments and for the size of the servicing bur- 
den associated with growing U.S. net international indebtedness. 
Some differential might be expected on the grounds that a part of U.S. di- 
rect investment abroad is located in countries where political and economic 
risks are significant. Some differential might also be explained by the newness 
of foreign direct investment in the United States. Time might be required be- 
fore new plants are fully operational, and accounting charges for amortiza- 
tion, depreciation, and interest might be larger in the early years of acquisi- 
tions. Investigation of  the role of  the factors in explaining the low reported 
rate of  return would be useful.Is Another part of the differential is probably 
the result of  tax  incentives which  lead  multinational  firms to use transfer 
prices to shift reported profits to lower tax jurisdictions abroad (see Wheeler 
1988). Although U.S.  corporate tax rates were lowered recently relative to 
those of other industrial countries, they still remain above rates in various tax 
havens. The incentive to report profits abroad will probably persist, inflating 
reported receipts on U.S.  direct investment abroad and depressing payments 
on foreign direct investment in the United States. Balancing this distortion of 
the direct investment accounts is the underreporting of exports of goods and 
services by  U.S. corporations to their affiliates abroad and the overstatement 
of the imports of goods and services by  the U.S.  affiliates of foreign compa- 
nies. These understatements of net credits on other current account items are 
likely to grow as direct investment in and out of  the United States continues 
to expand, so increasing errors in the returns on direct investment are likely to 
continue to be offset by growing errors in the opposite direction in other cur- 
rent account items.  l9 
9.4  'kade Balance Implications 
Does the recent rapid increase in foreign direct investment in  the United 
States indicate that the U.S. trade balance is likely to improve more rapidly 
than past experience (as measured by  most econometric models) would indi- 
cate? Is the data collected by BEA adequate to answer this question? 
Before addressing these questions, we  want to acknowledge that our ap- 
foreign direct investment in the United States in 1988 appeared to be about 4.5 percent, while the 
rate on U.S. direct investment abroad was 6.5 percent. 
18. One way to investigate the role of newness in explaining low rates of  return would require 
following individual affiliates and the change over time in their rates of return. This would require 
access to data that is not published. 
19. This assumes that the cost used  in calculating affiliates' profits is the same as the cost 
declared for customs purposes.  In  fact the IRS recently collected substantial back taxes from 
Toyota and Nissan on the grounds that their affiliates were overcharged for imported cars, under- 
stating profits. The IRS has ruled that if goods are subject to customs duties, firms may not charge 
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proach is partial equilibrium. Obviously, in a general equilibrium context, any 
desired shift in capital inflows has implications for exchange rates,  interest 
rates, inflation, GNP growth, and so on, and these implications will vary also 
depending  on government policy reactions.  In assessing the implications of 
direct investment for the trade balance, we focus only on the direct partial- 
equilibrium  effects  and do not  attempt to consider the general  equilibrium 
feedbacks on the trade balance. This partial equilibrium analysis would better 
be interpreted as indicating whether foreign direct investment  in the United 
States is changing the U.S. industrial structure and comparative advantage, 
rather than as measuring the realized improvement in the trade balance. More- 
over, underlying this analysis is the assumption that there are imperfections in 
the markets for goods, capital, technology, and so forth, so that a billion dol- 
lars invested by Honda to build a car assembly plant in Ohio has a different 
implication for the U.S. trade balance than a billion dollars invested by Honda 
in U.S. Treasury securities. 
Has foreign  direct  investment  in  the  United  States accelerated in  recent 
years, so that trade equations estimated using past history are likely to err? 
Two alternative measures are shown in the top panel of figure 9.1: the direct 
investment position (the solid line) and the total assets of U.S. nonbank affili- 
ates of foreigners (the dashed line). The bottom panel of the figure shows the 
direct investment position in constant (1964) prices.20  By all these measures, 
the growth of foreign direct investment  in the United  States has been rapid 
throughout  the  1970s and  198Os, although  the absolute increases have ob- 
viously been much larger in recent years. Relative to the size of all U.S. busi- 
nesses,  value added by U.S. affiliates of  foreigners increased between  1977 
and  1981 and then remained level through  1987 (Lowe 1990). There is little 
evidence in these data to indicate that the  trend  in recent years has been  a 
radical departure from the past,  likely  to invalidate trade relationships esti- 
mated over past years. 
Has the industry composition of direct investment inflows shifted in recent 
years in ways that would be expected to have larger implications for merchan- 
dise trade?  As  shown  on table 9.1, much foreign direct  investment  in  the 
United  States is in  industries that  are not  directly involved  in international 
trade: banking, finance, insurance, and real estate. In addition, acquisitions in 
retail trade, petroleum, or mining are not likely to result in the substitution of 
U.S. for foreign production  on a significant  scale. The merchandise sold at 
Bloomingdales  is not likely to change significantly because the store is now 
owned by a Canadian company. Nor is the sale by Texaco of certain refining 
and  distribution  assets to oil-producing  countries,  or the  purchase of  stock 
from minority shareholders by Shell or BP, likely to reduce U.S.  oil imports. 
Investment  in  wholesale  trade  is  likely  to  be  associated  with  increases, 
20. This series was created by starting with the direct investment position at the end of  1964 
and adding subsequent capital flows deflated by the CPI. 333  Adequacy of  U.S. Direct Investment Data 
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Fig. 9.1  Foreign direct investment in the United States 
rather than with reductions, in U.S.  imports. Much wholesale trade invest- 
ment is in sales, distribution, and servicing facilities for imported goods. That 
leaves manufacturing, which accounts for only part of foreign direct invest- 
ment in the United States, although its growth has accelerated in the last few 
years and has been faster than most other industries. 
However, this analysis must be qualified because of  the way affiliates’ re- 
ports are consolidated and classified by BEA. All activities of a given subsid- 334  Lois E. Stekler and Guy V.  G.  Stevens 
Table 9.1  Foreign Direct Investment Position in the United States by  Industry 
(billions of dollars) 
Average Annual 
Percentage Change 
1981  1985  1988  1982-85  1986-88 
All indusrries  109  185  328  14  21 
Manufacturing  41  60  121  10  26 
Wholesale and retail trade  21  36  65  14  22 
Petroleum and mining  17  32  35  17  3 
Banking, finance, and insurancea  15  27  40  16  14 
Real estate  9  19  32  21  19 
Other  6  I1  36  16  48 
Source: Survey of  Curreni Business. 
’The banking data are not strictly comparable with the data for other industries because changes 
in  net debt of banks to foreign parents are generally not included in the direct investment ac- 
counts. 
iary are consolidated and classified according to the primary activity of  the 
affiliate. As a result, considerable investment by Japanese auto companies in 
manufacturing facilities in the  United  States is classified under  wholesale 
trade; and plans by  Bridgestone to expand Firestone’s retail store network 
would probably appear under manufacturing. 
Replacing consolidate reporting on all direct investment surveys with re- 
porting by  establishment would involve a substantial duplication of  effort. 
Census already collects extensive data by  establishment, as part of  annual 
surveys of manufacturing and the census of industry (every 5 years). BEA  and 
Census are currently engaged in a pilot effort to use employment identification 
numbers for establishments reported to BEA,  to identify establishments affil- 
iated with foreigners in  the Census data-base. We  strongly support these ef- 
forts. Implementation would not only provide a more accurate picture of the 
role  of  foreign-owned  establishments  in  U.S.  manufacturing,  but  would 
greatly  facilitate  comparisons of  foreign and  domestic-owned  operations. 
Legislation proposed in  1989 by  Senator Murkowski (S.856) would  allow 
BEA  access to the survey reports of U.S. affiliates of foreign companies that 
are filed on a confidential basis with the Census. Since establishment data are 
necessary for many important purposes, we  strongly urge that other issues 
21. The 1980 and 1987 benchmark surveys did include some questions that shed light on these 
issues.  Affiliates were asked to classify sales and employment (1987 only) by  3-digit industry 
codes. In addition, they were asked to give the value of  land and other property, plants,  and 
equipment used in manufacturing (including petroleum refining). In 1987, “wholesale trade” affil- 
iates devoted more property, plants, and equipment to manufacturing motor vehicles and equip- 
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raised  by  the proposed  legislation be resolved  so that it can be passed  and 
implemented quickly.  22 
The rest of this section focuses exclusively on analyzing the impact on trade 
of foreign direct investment in U.S. manufacturing. There have been few stud- 
ies of this subject, although there is a vast literature on the trade implications 
of  U.S.  direct investment  The typical investment considered in the 
theoretical literature is a “greenfield”  investment (a new plant built abroad to 
supply foreign markets in place of exports of finished goods from the United 
States). Only a fraction of foreign direct investment in manufacturing indus- 
tries in the United States fits this description. For purposes of analysis of trade 
impacts  (and other issues as well)  it would  be useful  if  we could  separate 
greenfield investment (e.g., Honda’s building of an auto plant in Ohio) from 
mergers and acquisitions by  firms in the same industry (e.g., Bridgestone’s 
acquisition of Firestone) or acquisitions of firms in unrelated businesses (e.g., 
Seagram’s  investment  in  Du  Pont). Mergers  and  acquisitions,  particularly 
those motivated  by  the desire to diversify, are less likely than greenfield in- 
vestments to have significant trade implications.  Because BEA collects data 
on a consolidated basis, and because the same firm may establish some affili- 
ates and acquire others, it is not now possible to classify reporters as repre- 
senting greenfield investment.  However, it might be possible (although per- 
haps costly) to make such distinctions using data at the establishment level. 
Some light is shed on the relative importance of greenfield investment by 
BEA’s Annual Survey of U.S.  Business Enterprises Acquired or Established 
by Foreign Direct Investors (reported in the May Survey of Current Business). 
As indicated in table 9.2, the amounts invested in manufacturing through ac- 
quisitions and the total assets of the affiliates added through this method dwarf 
expenditures on new establishments in recent years. However, these data may 
be misleading.  They provide  no follow-up information on subsequent asset 
sales; acquisitions are frequently followed by spin-off of parts of the company 
acquired.24  The new establishment data include expenditures only in the first 
year. It seems likely that greenfield investment plays only a small role in for- 
eign direct investment in U.S. manufacturing,  although we lack precise data 
to support this conclusion. 
A related question is the relative importance  of  acquisitions versus plant 
and equipment expenditures in explaining the recent increases in the assets of 
22. Legislation permitting BEA and Census to share data on direct investments was passed in 
1990. 
23. See Bergsten, Horst, and Moran  (1978), for a review of this literature. More recent ex- 
amples of the effects of U.S.  investment abroad on trade include Lipsey and Weiss (1981, 1984) 
and Blomstrom, Lipsey, and Kulchycky (1988). 
24. Information on assets sold by affiliates is available from a different BEA survey, although 
the data are not currently published. They do not distinguish between assets previously acquired 
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Table 9.2  Foreign Acquisitions and New Establishments in US. Manufacturing 
(billions of dollars) 
Investment Outlays  Assets of Affiliates 
Acquisitions  New Establishments  Acquired  Established 
1981  7.8  .3  29.3  .4 
1982  2.1  .2  4.6  .7 
1983  3.0  .I  3.7  .2 
1984  2.7  .4  5.7  .9 
1985  11.7  .4  14.8  1.3 
1986  16.1  .7  18.7  I .2 
1987  18.9  .9  23.2  1.8 
1988  29.7  1.8  35.4  3.6 
foreign-owned manufacturing affiliates. Unfortunately, this question also can- 
not be answered with currently available data.25 
One area of greenfield investment that has received considerable attention 
is Japanese investment in auto production in the United States. Case studies, 
such as the study of auto investment by GAO (1988), can be very useful in 
identifying analytic issues and data inadequacies. The GAO study did not use 
BEA data and focused primarily on the question of the direct impact on auto 
industry  employment  (ignoring  macroeconomic  determinants  of  employ- 
ment). As the GAO study points out, assessment of the direct impact of Japa- 
nese car production  in the United States on employment in the industry de- 
pends crucially  on whether the cars produced in the United  States displace 
imports from Japan or cars produced by U.S. or other foreign manufacturers. 
At one extreme, if it is assumed that car production  in the U.S. by Japanese 
manufacturers  is matched by reduced imports, then the improvement in the 
U.S. trade balance would equal the reduction in finished car imports less the 
value of imported parts used in Japanese car production in the United States. 
On the other hand, if production in the United States allows Japanese compa- 
nies to increase their share of the market at the expense of U.S.  producers, 
and  if  the  import  content  of Japanese-brand  cars is higher than  the  import 
content of U.S.-brand cars, investment by Japanese companies in production 
facilities in the United States could worsen the trade balance. The actual out- 
come is probably somewhere between these extremes.26 
The presence of barriers to Japanese car imports increases the likelihood of 
the less favorable trade outcome. If the voluntary export restraints effectively 
constrained the market share of Japanese cars, then Japanese companies might 
25. The benchmark survey asks firms to decompose the change in net property plant and equip- 
ment in  1987 and to provide data on new  plant and equipment expenditures and depreciation. 
However, increases resulting from acquisitions are lumped into a category labeled “restatement.” 
See U.S. Department of Commerce (1989), table D7. 
26. The outcome would also depend on macroeconomic interactions. 337  Adequacy of U.S. Direct Investment Data 
build production facilities in the United States in order to increase their market 
share, even if  production in Japan remained the cheaper way  to supply the 
U.S. market. Under these circumstances, one would expect imports from Ja- 
pan  to remain at the quota level. Projections into the future would require 
assumptions about future price and exchange-rate developments. BEA cur- 
rently collects some information on costs of production from U.S. affiliates, 
but none from foreign parents on their operations outside the United States. 
Such data would be very useful, but attempts to collect it might cause serious 
international frictions. 
Another crucial question is the import content of Japanese- and U.S.-brand 
cars. Currently the import content of  Japanese cars produced in the United 
States is estimated at about 40  to 50 percent, while the import content of U.S.- 
brand cars is about 10 percent. But, over time, many observers expect these 
percentages to  converge as  Japanese manufacturers increasingly use  parts 
manufactured in the United  States.  These estimates of  import content are 
based not on BEA data, but rather on auto industry sources. BEA does collect 
information on imports by U.S. affiliates, but consolidation of wholesale trade 
with manufacturing makes it impossible to use the data to calculate the import 
content of produ~tion.~’  For this purpose establishment data are needed. It 
would also be useful to have information on Japanese direct investment in the 
U. S. auto-parts industry. However, the industry breakdowns currently used by 
BEA do not provide information on an end-use basis. 
In  conclusion, case studies of  greenfield investments can produce useful 
insights into likely effects on trade flows. However, it is very difficult to assess 
the relative importance of each case to the overall trade balance. What part of 
greenfield direct investment in the United States is in the auto industry? Are 
other greenfield investments clustered in protected industries? Does the im- 
port content of foreign-owned production in the United States tend to fall over 
time? These are all questions that could be answered if  BEA data were avail- 
able on an establishment level, and if greenfield investments could be sepa- 
rated from others. 
We turn now to mergers and acquisitions. Their impact on trade could go in 
either direction. If  acquisitions result in improved management, the applica- 
tion of  more advanced technology, and modernization of  plants and equip- 
ment, they could make production in the United States more competitive and 
tend to improve the trade balance. On the other hand, consolidation of  the 
new company could result in the transfer of advanced technology to foreign- 
ers, the shift of production of  some products abroad, or the use of the U.S. 
27. The benchmark survey does ask for the value of imports from foreign parents and others 
that are for resale without further processing, assembly, or manufacture by the U.S. affiliate. By 
subtraction, one could obtain the value of imports that were used in production. However, it is not 
clear how to  adjust the sales data to  exclude the value of imported goods sold without further 
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affiliate to distribute imports.28  If foreign affiliates were identified in the Cen- 
sus of  Manufacturers data, comparison of  domestic establishments and for- 
eign affiliates could provide information that would be  useful in  assessing 
these alternatives. 
Another possibility is that the acquisition of  10 percent or more of a U.S. 
company’s equity is essentially a portfolio investment and has no direct impli- 
cations for trade. Seagram’s investment in Du Pont would probably fall into 
this category. One piece of information that might be useful in distinguishing 
portfolio-type investments from others (apart from information on control, 
discussed earlier) is whether the parent is in the same industry as the affiliate. 
Currently BEA surveys do not provide information on what type of manufac- 
turing a foreign parent is engaged in. 
If foreign direct investments in  the United States, whether greenfield in- 
vestments or acquisitions, are likely to  have  a significant impact on U.S. 
trade, one would expect to observe increases in plant and equipment expend- 
itures by  these affiliates. New plant and equipment expenditures by manufac- 
turing affiliates were level between 1981 and  1986, but increased by  almost 
25 percent in  1987 (the latest data available). In contrast, Census’s survey of 
new  plant and equipment expenditures in  manufacturing for the U.S. econ- 
omy as a whole indicated that they increased by only 2 percent in  1987. This 
quarterly Census survey of  investment plans for U.S. companies in general 
could provide much more up-to-date information on recent investments and 
current plans of affiliates of foreign companies. This would be another reward 
of closer cooperation between BEA and Census. 
9.5  The Impact of Direct Investment Operations on Economic Welfare 
The analysis of  the various effects of  U.S. direct investment abroad has 
been a major preoccupation for many years.29  The preoccupation has just re- 
cently been extended to direct investment in the United state~.~~  However, 
since most empirical studies have dealt with U.S. direct investment abroad, 
our discussion of  the effects of  foreign investment in the United States will 
necessarily be limited. 
The majority of the studies fall into two broad classes, with quite different 
uses of available data. The studies in the first class, which has by far the most 
28. One of the reasons frequently cited in the literature on why U.S. direct investment abroad 
has had little negative impact on net US.  exports is that U.S. firms setting up production facilities 
abroad also have  expanded their distribution networks and have been better positioned to take 
advantage of market opportunities. Increasing market share outweighed the shift of  some produc- 
tion abroad. 
29. For comprehensive general surveys, see Caves (1982) and Reuber (1973). Musgrave (1975) 
is an outstanding and comprehensive investigation of the effect of U.S. direct investment abroad 
on the United States. 
30. See, for example, Graham and Krugman (1989). Tolchin and Tolchin (1988), and for an 
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members, do not attempt a comprehensive evaluation of the impact of direct 
investment on economic  welfare,  but rather concentrate on specific tests of 
hypotheses concerned with the impact of particular factors. Methodologically, 
such studies usually compare the behavior of foreign-owned enterprises with 
a sample of other firms: local firms, domestic U.S. firms, or foreign subsidi- 
aries in other countries. 
The second class of studies, which has relatively few members, attempts to 
evaluate the overall impact of, usually, a single investment on economic wel- 
fare; invariably  such studies proceed by applying cost-benefit analysis to the 
flows associated with a given direct investment project. 
9.5.1  Tests of Particular Attributes of Direct Investment Enterprises 
Most studies in this class have utilized one of two types of data:  (1) data 
allowing the comparison of the operations of foreign subsidiaries with domes- 
tically-owned firms in a given country; and (2) data allowing the comparison 
of the operations of foreign subsidiaries in a number of different countries. 
All studies using the first type of data involve detailed comparisons, often 
statistical, of firm operations at the level of the establishment.  Occasionally, 
privately collected data are used (e.g., Wells  1973), but typically a national 
census  of  manufacturing  is  the  source.  Important  questions  examined  are 
whether foreign affiliates are more efficient than their domestic counterparts, 
whether there are differences in the capital intensity of  the production pro- 
cesses  chosen,  and  whether  foreign  affiliates pay  higher  wages.  A careful 
study  at the  establishment  level (Lim 1977) confirmed  the finding of other 
studies that, on the average, foreign subsidiaries pay higher wages than their 
domestic counterparts. For a given level of employment, this finding means a 
higher level of  payments to domestic factors and higher economic welfare in 
the host economy. However, if the wage rate is higher than the true marginal 
cost of labor, the level of employment by the foreign subsidiary and, perhaps 
the capital/labor  ratio, will  be  suboptimal.  The evidence on efficiency and 
capital intensity was less clear. There was some evidence that in some coun- 
tries foreign affiliates use more capital-intensive techniques (Wells 1973, for 
Indonesia), but other studies found no clear picture (Corbo and Havrylyshyn 
1982, for Canada; Morley and Smith 1977, for Bra~il).~'  In terms of produc- 
tive efficiency, however, few if any studies could detect significant differences 
between  the two classes of  firms  (Corbo and Havrylyshyn  1982, Vendrell- 
Alda 1978, Morley and Smith 1977). 
Studies comparing  the behavior of  subsidiaries of  multinational  corpora- 
tions have usually focused on the differences in behavior between subsidiaries 
in developed and developing countries. Two studies, in particular,  should be 
3 1. Morley and Smith seemed to find some tendency for foreign subsidiaries to be more capital 
intensive, although this was hard to detect because of what they viewed as deficient data on capital 
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noted for their use of the BEA data to examine the question of the choice of 
technology and the efficiency of subsidiaries in developing countries (Court- 
ney  and Leipziger  1975; Lipsey,  Kravis,  and Roldan  1982). Both  studies 
found strong evidence that subsidiaries respond to cost differentials by  adopt- 
ing more  labor-intensive methods in developing countries. Lipsey, Kravis, 
and Roldan, in a very comprehensive investigation, arrived at this conclusion 
for both U.S. and Swedish-owned subsidiaries, comparing the labor intensity 
of production not only among subsidiaries, but also between subsidiaries and 
the parent firm. 
The BEA data, collected at the enterprise level, may involve the aggrega- 
tion of a number of establishments in a given country. Although the studies 
discussed above have shown that the analysis of  the BEA data can lead to 
useful results, virtually all researchers advocate the collection and use of es- 
tablishment-level data; these data minimize errors caused by  the aggregation 
of different products and inputs that result from the aggregation of different 
establishments in a given country. Unfortunately, BEA has never required data 
at the establishment level, partly, perhaps, because the data system initially 
concerned itself only with balance-of-payments flows, where a natural unit of 
measurement is the country aggregate. We  will argue below that the failure to 
require collection of data at the enterprise level is particularly regrettable since 
the requisite establishment data in most cases have already been collected by 
national authorities abroad, through national censuses of manufacturers (often 
modeled on the U.S.  Census of  Manufacturers). Hence, in most cases, no 
additional burden would be imposed on reporters by requiring data at the es- 
tablishment level-data  already reported to national authoritie~.~~ 
9.5.2  Tests of the Overall Benefit-Cost Ratio of a Direct Investment 
The ultimate goal of this second class of studies is the comprehensive eval- 
uation of all the benefits and costs for a particular direct investment (or group 
of them), leading to an overall assessment of its desirability for a given econ- 
omy. It is our goal to determine whether the existing BEA data, or any other 
data that BEA might feasibly collect, are sufficient to carry out the requisite 
benefit-cost analysis. 
The typical calculation of the contribution of direct investment to the host 
or home country concentrates solely on its impact on the national income of 
the country in question. Other important welfare questions, such as the impact 
on the distribution of  income, are set aside. The benefit-cost technique has 
32. We understand the concern of  our discussant, Betty Barker, with respect to the possible 
difficulties in interpreting data from different countries. However, since most of these censuses of 
manufacturing have been patterned after our own, there is much more consistency across countries 
than might initially be expected. On this issue, see Lipsey (1985). 
These data for U.S.-owned  subsidiaries reported at the establishment level to national authori- 
ties are, of  course, the same data that were analyzed by Corbo and Havrylyshyn (1982). Morley 
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been  applied to direct  investment in rather convincing  fashion  by  La11  and 
Streeten (1977) and Encarnation and Wells (1986). Given the data available, 
the ease of quantifying  properly  the appropriate benefits and costs depends 
importantly on whether the key product and input markets are perfect (i.e., on 
whether prices reflect societal marginal costs).  If this is the case, the prices 
embedded in normally collected flows, such as sales and wage payments, can 
be  used  without modification; if  not,  adjusted or “shadow”  prices  must  be 
used-estimates  that are as close as possible to the societal marginal costs. 
Of  course, most  practical  applications  to direct  investments  in  developing 
countries necessitate careful adjustment of or substitution for market prices. 
For the United States, probably fewer adjustments need to be made; but, we 
would argue, most of the interesting cases require some adjustments neverthe- 
less. 
The Pegect-Markets Case 
The analysis of the costs and benefits of  direct investment  dates to Mac- 
Dougall’s (1960) seminal article “The Benefits and Costs of  Private Invest- 
ment from Abroad.” MacDougall analyzed primarily the perfect-markets  case 
and treated direct investment as merely a transfer of  real capital from a low- 
return home country to a high-return host country. Under such assumptions, 
as long as capital is paid its marginal product, the resulting national income 
of  both host and home countries would be at least as high after the transfer, 
and probably higher. The capital stock that host country factors have to work 
with  has increased, thus leading to increased returns,  and owners of capital 
from the home country have improved their situation by shifting capital to a 
higher-yielding location.  33 
Can we measure  these benefits  in the classic case by  using the available 
U.S.  data  on  direct  investments?  In  many  situations  we  can.  Given  the 
perfect-markets as~umption,~~  a traditional cost-benefit calculation using data 
provided in the Census of Direct Investments should lead to a sound empirical 
estimate of the gains to home and host factors. Rather than measures of mar- 
ginal output, the Census of  Direct Investments provides data on sales-total 
output times price. However, the marginal value created by the investment can 
be calculated from sales by subtracting the value lost from domestic produc- 
tion by bidding other factors away from domestic firms or importing factors 
from abroad. Assuming the prices of  these factors represent  their marginal 
value product, if  we  subtract off  the  value of  payments to labor and  other 
factors, what  we have  left is the  direct  investment’s marginal  output.  This 
33. Labor payments will generally be lower in the home country, but it can be shown that, 
given perfect markets and constant returns to scale, the gains to capital outweigh the losses to 
labor in the home country and that, therefore, national income increases. 
34. And, probably, that of constant returns to scale, so that factor payments according to mar- 
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quantity is divided between taxes of  various kinds and profits of  the direct 
investor.35  As  noted  above, these data have  been  available in census years 
since 1957. 
Departures from the Classic Case 
Unfortunately, we  are frequently in a world in  which prices depart from 
marginal costs or, in the case of  product prices, from marginal benefits or 
utilities. As  early as  1955, Pizer and Cutler made a start toward measuring 
costs and benefits of  direct investment under nonclassic conditions (see U.S. 
Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics 1957). Subsequent 
U.S.  censuses of  direct investment abroad and in the United  States, which 
collected increasingly detailed data on the operating characteristics of  affili- 
ates,  at least offer the possibility of  making benefit-cost evaluations in the 
typical situation when markets are not perfect. Such situations, we might add, 
are not limited to developing countries. A good example is the analysis of the 
impact of  foreign-owned automobile assembly and manufacturing plants  in 
the United States, a market in which market prices for autos have been dis- 
torted by quotas on Japanese imports.36 
A small but significant literature has developed since the work of Pizer and 
Cutler and MacDougall that has applied benefit-cost analysis to foreign in- 
vestments  in  situations where  one  or  more  market  prices  are  not  proper 
shadow prices (i.e., are not equal to societal marginal costs). Important in this 
class are Encarnation and Wells (1986) and La11  and Streeten (1977). Both of 
these  studies examine microeconomic data for specific foreign investment 
projects. For all such studies, where a particular observed price is distorted, 
the operating data for the foreign affiliates must be supplemented by estimates 
of  shadow prices. In choosing shadow prices, both studies adopt the proce- 
dure advocated in the analysis by Little and Mirrlees (1974): where prices are 
distorted by  tariff, quotas, or foreign-exchange controls, free-market prices 
should be used as the shadow price. An implicit assumption of this procedure 
is that free trade is a feasible alternative situation. A discussion of other ap- 
proaches to certain shadow prices where free trade is not a feasible alternative, 
can be found in La11 and Streeten (1977) and Roemer and Stem (1975). 
For concreteness, using the Little-Mirrlees framework, consider the calcu- 
lation for a given year of the “net social income effect,” Y:37 
35. Implicit here is the assumption of constant returns to scale. 
36. See the excellent study on the subject done by the U.S. General Accounting Office (1988). 
37. Over the life of  a given investment,  the value of  Y  may vary over time; it may even be 
negative in some years (a likely possibility when the investment is starting up) and at times will 
involve payments for capital goods and construction. We agree with a discussant that to calculate 
the overall societal value of the investment, the analyst must use a social discount rate to calculate 
a net present (social) value. We also agree that the calculation of social discount rates and shadow 
prices is subject to substantial error and therefore warrants a sensitivity analysis of  the results to 
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(1)  Y  = (X + S,)  - (C,  + R  + D)  - (C,  + C,, + Ls  + K,) 
where X  = the value of exports priced at free market prices; S,  = the free 
market value of domestic sales; C, = the c.i.f. value of imported raw materi- 
als and other inputs; R  = royalties and technical fees (after tax); D = after- 
tax profits and interest; C,,  C,, = the shadow values of domestically produced 
tradable and nontradable inputs; L, = the shadow value of scarce labor inputs; 
and K,  = the shadow value of  local capital services. By  using the identity 
linking sales and payments, the net social income effect, K  can also be ex- 
pressed as the sum of taxes and other payments to the government, payments 
above shadow wages to labor, and other payments above the relevant shadow 
prices to the local private sector. 
Let us now consider whether present census data permit the calculation of 
the various entries listed in the above equation. Data in nominal dollars are 
reported for most of the categories appearing on both sides of the equality in 
equation (1). Possible exceptions deal with the raw materials categories. No 
direct figure for nonlabor inputs is collected in the present census, although it 
may be possible to construct one by eliminating wages and other items from 
the figure “cost of goods sold.” 
It  is possible to get the proper data for imported inputs (CJ, at least for 
foreign affiliates in  the United  States (the total of  imports in  the category 
“goods intended for further processing, assembly, or manufacture”). For U.S. 
subsidiaries abroad, the fact that this break is available only for imports from 
the  United  States may be  satisfactory, since this is the item that  would be 
required to measure benefits to the United States. 
The more difficult problem is to substitute shadow prices for the various 
prices embedded in the nominal flows reported in the census. Shadow prices 
in some countries are likely to deviate from actual prices, notably with respect 
to product prices,  labor payments, energy prices, domestic financial costs, 
and anything going through the foreign-exchange market. Clearly the absence 
of separate price information for the firm’s accounts is a hindrance; there is 
little or no breakdown of census flows into price and quantity  component^.^^ 
However, of the studies discussed in this section, only Encamation and Wells 
had the luxury of  such rich data. In lieu of  the quantity-price breakdowns, 
what must be done is to estimate the percentage by  which various prices are 
under- or over-valued and to apply the appropriate percentage-correction fac- 
tor to the flow  in question.  At  the micro and macro level this requires the 
further assumption that the observation in question deviates from the shadow 
price by the average percentage in the country or area. If we had at least some 
separate product-price information for the affiliates involved, we  could then 
take account of affiliates whose observed prices deviate by  more or less than 
38. An exception is the labor sector, where the provision of real variables such as hours worked 
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the average deviation from the proper shadow price (assuming shadow prices 
are not firm- or affiliate-specific). 
9.6  Explaining and Forecasting Direct Investment Flows and 
Activities 
This section addresses the adequacy of data currently collected to test hy- 
potheses about direct investor behavior. Understanding the role of various fac- 
tors in explaining past  developments is crucial to developing the ability to 
forecast. It is necessary to understand  why firms launch investments across 
national  boundaries, what  factors  influence the expansion  of  existing  affili- 
ates, and how these and other factors influence direct investment capital flows. 
9.6.1  New Investments: Takeovers and Greenfield Investment 
Research on the multinational firm has to a significant extent concentrated 
on the question of  the determinants of new  direct  investments.  (See, e.g., 
Hufbauer 1975, Caves 1982, and Dunning  1988, for good surveys.) The ac- 
cepted theory emphasizes industry- and firm-specific advantages that for vary- 
ing reasons are best  exploited by  foreign production  and direct ownership, 
rather than by international trade or licensing. Thus, for example, whether a 
firm is a foreign investor or not is correlated with industry characteristics such 
as research and development and advertising intensity, and within a given in- 
dustry, the size of the firm.39 
Rarely are the BEA data alone sufficient to test hypotheses  in this  area, 
although in many cases these data are a necessary part of the data-set. Thus, 
Horst  1972a and Caves  1974 used as a dependent variable in their studies the 
ratio  of  sales of  foreign subsidiaries  to total  industry  sales;  the  numerator 
would require sales data for foreign subsidiaries as collected by BEA.40  On 
the other hand, most of the independent variables are related to either industry 
characteristics or parent-firm data. Variables in the former category typically 
require data outside the BEA data-set, since the industry averages for the BEA 
sample alone are not  likely  to be indicative  of  the population  as a  whole; 
variables such as industry concentration ratios, R&D expenditures, and aver- 
age plant size have been used in the studies mentioned above. For variables 
measuring the attributes of a parent firm that invests abroad, BEA’s periodic 
censuses provide a data source of ever-increasing richness. However, when a 
study compares the characteristics of noninvestors to foreign investors, clearly 
data for the noninvestors must be gathered from separate  source^.^' 
39. See Richard Caves’s outstanding book, Multinational Enterprise and Economic Analysis 
(1982), for encyclopedic coverage of  the issues discussed in this section and an evaluation of the 
evidence bearing on the related testable hypotheses. Of particular interest regarding the character- 
istics of foreign investors, see Caves’s own article (1974) and Horst (1972b). 
40. In  the two studies noted, the authors used non-U.S. sources of data-from  Canada and the 
United Kingdom. 
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An  additional  level of  data problems awaits researchers  trying to explain 
the recent wave of takeovers and greenfield investments in the United States. 
One can assume, following the studies noted above, that much of the expla- 
nation depends on the characteristics  of the investing parent firms; however, 
very little information is readily available on the foreign parents of  subsidi- 
aries in the United States. BEA collects virtually no data on the characteristics 
of the foreign parents of the U.S.  subsidiaries that form its sample. BEA has 
an understandable reluctance to impose data requirements on foreign firms- 
the foreign parents-when  such requirements might raise sensitive questions 
of  international  law.  Some data on foreign parents  might  be filled in from 
public sources, but at present an important class of data has escaped BEA’s 
data-collection system. Nevertheless, by using international data, data related 
only to the markets in the United  States, and data on foreign parents from 
public  and private  sources, some interesting  work  has recently  been  com- 
pleted. (See in particular, Ray 1989, Caves and Mehra 1986.) 
9.6.2  The Expansion of Existing Subsidiaries 
Most forecasting of  direct investment variables-the  balance-of-payments 
capital flow and, particularly, fixed investment expenditures-has  been based 
on  theoretical  models  developed  to explain and  predict  the expansion of 
already-existing  subsidiarie~.~~  In  such models, the factors discussed  above 
that have determined the initial establishment of the subsidiary, such as the 
size and technical  progressiveness  of the parent, are assumed to no longer 
affect the expansion of  the subsidiary.  Rather, the dependent variables have 
been related to more traditional investment theories and data. To use plant and 
equipment expenditure as an example, ideas embodied in the flexible acceler- 
ator and neoclassic investment functions have been applied, sometimes with a 
twist, directly to the investment  of  foreign  s~bsidiaries.~~  For fixed invest- 
ment, such equations require  measures of output and its growth and of the 
existing  capital stock, and perhaps measures  of  the cost of  capital and the 
costs of other inputs. Most of these variables are available in the balance-sheet 
and income-statement data supplied annually to BEA by the individual sub- 
sidiaries  (both  U.S .-owned subsidiaries  abroad  and foreign-owned  subsidi- 
aries in  the United  States). When an attempt  is  made  to model  the  direct 
investment capital flow-a  financial variable-in  addition to the above vari- 
ables, factors such as interest cost differentials and tax considerations presum- 
ably also come into play. Some of  these additional factors may require data 
outside the BEA system. 
42. See, e.g., Helkie and Stekler (1987) and the direct investment equations in Stevens et al. 
(1984); Stevens (1974) provides a survey of most of the issues and results discussed in this section. 
43. Stevens and Lipsey (1988) found some evidence of an interdependence between parent- 
firm investment in the United States and the investment of foreign affiliates abroad. This interde- 
pendence implied a generalized investment function, where, in addition to the usual determinants 
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For  aggregate equations that usually must be  used  for forecasting (e.g., 
Helkie and Stekler 1987), subsidiary output measures may be aggregated to 
appropriate country or area totals, or foreign or U.S. GNP may be substituted 
for the subsidiary aggregates. Although the specific explanatory or forecast- 
ing equations in these studies have been closely linked to the theory, it should 
be recalled that neither the theory nor the equations are really designed to 
explain takeovers and greenfield investments. Thus, in periods like the present 
one when this type of investment predominates, it should not be surprising if 
such equations do poorly. 
9.7  Conclusions 
BEA has for many years collected an impressive body of  data on direct 
investment, designed to cast light on a wide variety of  important issues. We 
have examined the adequacy of this data system for answering the important 
questions in four areas: the measurement of the U.S. investment position and 
servicing burden; the interaction between direct investment and the trade bal- 
ance; the effects of direct investment on economic welfare; and the explana- 
tion and forecasting of direct investment flows and activities. 
We  find charges that BEA’s data omit half of  foreign direct investment in 
the United States wildly implausible. There may be many small investors who 
are unaware of reporting requirements and therefore fail to report, but it is 
unlikely that their omission changes any important feature of the overall pic- 
ture. There seems little reason to doubt that BEA surveys include most direct 
investment and that the basic data on income and capital flows are in most 
cases accurate, in the sense that they accurately reflect the reporters’ books. 
On the other hand, the accuracy of answers supplied by  the treasurer’s of- 
fices of  the reporters to survey questions requiring data that they would not 
normally collect for their own purposes is much more variable. Perhaps influ- 
enced by  Washington’s general preoccupation with reducing the paperwork 
burden and by OMB’s abdication of its former responsibility for the assurance 
of data quality, firms seem increasingly less willing to go out of their way and 
to devote resources to provide accurate data. In our experience, this problem 
is not confined to the area of direct investment. 
In the four subject areas we  have explored, we have inevitably identified 
some important questions that cannot be answered with the existing data. The 
answers to some of  these questions are in principle unobtainable by  BEA, 
since the requisite data would have to come from outside the existing universe 
of direct investors. The prediction of greenfield investment by  foreigners and 
the measurement of the impact of foreign affiliate production on imports may 
be two such questions. 
However, we have also identified a number of ways in which we think the 
existing data system can be improved. Our specific recommendations include: 
1. With respect to the definition of  direct investment, it is our view that 
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rule. However, BEA should provide data on key variables (e.g., assets, sales, 
etc.) based on a range of ownership cutoffs, to call attention to the fact that 
currently published data using the  10-percent rule exaggerate the extent of 
foreign control of  the U.S. economy. Some consideration should be given to 
efforts to distinguish affiliates with some foreign participation in management 
from those controlled by foreigners. 
2. To  facilitate comparisons and resolve inconsistencies, attention should 
be given to the harmonization of  the definition of  direct investment among 
different countries. 
3. Given BEA’s extremely tight resource constraints, the diversion of BEA 
resources to construct a market-based or replacement-cost value for the direct 
investment position should not be given high priority, Neither of  these alter- 
natives would provide a more accurate indicator of the future servicing burden 
implied by accumulating U.S. current-account deficits. 
4. A much higher priority should be given to the question of why income 
reported on  foreign direct  investment in  the  United  States is  so low  and 
whether these low returns are likely to persist. 
5. Since, in our view,  the direct investment data have been underutilized 
because of  problems related to the confidentiality of  the affiliate reports, we 
encourage BEA to reexamine its suppression rules for the published data and 
to pursue even more actively cooperative research projects with academic and 
government researchers .& 
6. While recognizing that requiring data on the operations of  the foreign 
parents of  U.S.  affiliates raises delicate questions of  international law,  we 
point out that insofar as affiliate production and investment decisions are re- 
lated to parent operations, the United States is missing completely an impor- 
tant class of direct investment data. This is one of a number of areas where the 
provision of adequate data for any given country may depend upon interna- 
tional cooperation. 
7. A recurring problem in the analysis of direct investment is the absence 
of  data at the establishment level. Given that the U.S. affiliates of  foreign 
companies report at the establishment level in the U.S. Census of Manufactur- 
ers, and that the foreign affiliates of U.S. companies report at the establish- 
ment level in similar surveys by  many foreign governments, establishment- 
level data on production, investment, costs, prices, employment, and related 
areas could be provided without substantially increasing reporting burden.45 
These data are necessary to improve our knowledge in the following areas: the 
disaggregated industry composition of  direct investment in the United States 
and abroad; the separation of greenfield from other investments; and the ac- 
44. We note the similar conclusion reached by Vukmanic, Czinkota and Ricks (1983,  Lipsey 
(1985), and Graham and Krugman  (1989). It  should also be noted that the  statutory authority 
under which the direct investment data are now collected specifically envisages such cooperation 
with researchers. 
45. See Lipsey (1985) for a similar view and details on how this step could be taken with little 
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curate comparison of the behavior of foreign-owned and domestic firms with 
respect to, among other things, productivity and wage rates. 
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Tar Notes. 
Comment  Betty L. Barker 
This paper is a balanced presentation of both the uses and the limitations of 
the data collected by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) on U.S. direct 
investment abroad and foreign direct investment  in the United  States.  After 
careful review, the authors conclude that BEA’s basic data system is sound 
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and satisfies most of the needs of data users. However, they identify a number 
of data limitations. I agree with their conclusions. The question is the extent 
to which it is feasible to correct the limitations. 
There are several constraints on BEA’s  ability to collect additional data. 
First is the requirement under the Paperwork Reduction Act to reduce the 
reporting burden of  government surveys. Second, in  some cases companies 
have indicated that the desired data are not available from their books and 
records and so cannot be reported. Third, in recent years budget and resource 
constraints have been a significant factor. Despite these constraints, BEA is 
working on improving its data in a number of areas. 
My  comments are focused on the feasibility of  implementing the recom- 
mendations made in the paper. I will also discuss some of the data improve- 
ments BEA has made, is making, or plans to make. 
The authors correctly point out that BEA’s  10-percent ownership criterion 
for defining direct investment is somewhat arbitrary. It is, however, the per- 
centage established by law at which an enterprise in one country is deemed to 
have  sufficient influence over the management of  an  enterprise in  another 
country that its interest is no longer purely passive. Stekler and Stevens rec- 
ommend that BEA continue to collect its data using this 10-percent criterion, 
but that in publishing data, subjective criteria be used as well, in order to more 
closely approach a concept of “control.” BEA believes that objective criteria 
are needed if  the resulting data-set is to be consistently and clearly defined. 
Subjective criteria are difficult to apply consistently or to enforce in a large, 
complex data system such as ours. In addition, the use of  subjective criteria 
would require the collection of more information (e.g., on the number of for- 
eigners on the board of directors or in top management, or on how dispersed 
the remaining ownership interests are). Although BEA could consider collect- 
ing this information in future surveys, the basic definition of direct investment 
is unlikely to change. 
Several shortcomings identified in the BEA data are the result of collecting 
data on an enterprise basis. On this basis, BEA obtains one report covering 
the fully consolidated U.S. business enterprise. Collection of data on an enter- 
prise basis is necessary because this  is the  only basis on  which  financial- 
statement information  and  the  information needed  in  compiling the  U.S. 
balance-of-payments accounts are available. Also, for enterprises, consoli- 
dated reporting is the standard method of reporting for accounting purposes. 
Some of  the consequences of  collecting information only  on  an enterprise 
basis are: limited industry (and, for foreign direct investment in  the United 
States, State by  industry) detail; inability to compile separate data over time 
for U.S. affiliates that are newly established and for those that are acquired by 
foreign investors; and difficulty in disaggregating data for U.S.  affiliates of 
foreign companies by percentage of ownership. 
In the BEA data, each enterprise is classified in its primary industry (i.e., 
in the industry in which its sales are largest). This classification may obscure 
the industrial diversity of an enterprise that has activities in secondary indus- 352  Lois E. Stekler and Guy V.  G. Stevens 
tries. BEA has partly remedied this shortcoming by obtaining two data items, 
sales and employment, disaggregated  by each industry in which an affiliate 
has sales. Thus, sales and the associated employment in secondary industries 
can be shown in those industries rather than all sales and employment being 
shown only in the affiliate’s primary  industry. It should be noted,  however, 
that the resulting data on sales and employment disaggregated by industry of 
sales can only be shown at the (approximately) 3-digit SIC industry level at 
which the data are collected. 
One way to obtain additional industry detail would be through collection of 
establishment-  or plant-level  data. The Census Bureau  is already collecting 
establishment-level data for U.S. companies, but the data for the establish- 
ments of foreign-owned U.S. enterprises are not separately tabulated. If BEA 
and Census data could be linked, Census establishment data for BEA direct 
investment enterprises could be obtained without imposing any additional re- 
porting burden on the business community. Legislation giving BEA access to 
the confidential establishment data collected by the Census Bureau and fund- 
ing for the project to link BEA enterprise data and Census establishment data 
for foreign-owned U.S. companies have been obtained.  Initial results of the 
link project are scheduled for publication in mid- 1992. 
Another consequence of collecting foreign direct investment data only on a 
consolidated  enterprise basis  is the inability  to compile data separately over 
time for newly established and for acquired enterprises. An entity established 
in one year could in the next year acquire another enterprise that is merged or 
consolidated with the first entity. Thereafter, BEA receives one report for the 
consolidated  enterprise  and cannot  show data separately for the part of  the 
enterprise that was established and the part that was acquired. The linking of 
BEA enterprise and Census establishment data should facilitate the ability to 
track established and acquired U.S. affiliates separately over time. 
Collecting data on a consolidated enterprise basis also makes it difficult to 
disaggregate  the  data for foreign-owned  U.S. companies  by  percentage  of 
ownership.  In its surveys, BEA obtains the percentage of foreign ownership 
of the top U.S. parent in the consolidated enterprise, but not the percentage of 
ownership by a foreign person in each of the entities in the ownership chain 
below that top U.S. parent. Thus, arraying the data by percentage of foreign 
ownership of each of  the entities in the consolidated enterprise is not possible. 
It is, however, possible to array the data by percentage of foreign ownership 
of  the  top  U.S. parent  of  the enterprise. BEA  published  separate data  for 
majority-owned and minority-owned U. S. affiliates of  foreign companies on 
this basis for the first time in the July  1990 Survey of  Current Business. We 
also plan to investigate how to refine the data further, as time and resources 
permit, to give data users a better idea of the extent of foreign ownership of 
U.S. businesses. 
The authors  indicate  a need  not only for establishment data for foreign- 
owned U.S.  affiliates, but also for such data for U.S.-owned foreign affiliates. 
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data that these affiliates report to their host country governments.  Although 
this idea deserves serious study, a number of  problems may make implemen- 
tation difficult. For example, establishment data are not available for all coun- 
tries and, where available, are not consistent in concept and definition across 
countries. Also, the data may be reported in foreign currency units on forms 
that are in foreign languages. Compilation of comparable data across coun- 
tries will therefore be extremely difficult. In addition, the collection of these 
data will impose a significant burden on U.S. parent companies, which must 
obtain the information  from their foreign affiliates and forward it to BEA. It 
should also be noted that, in BEA’s data, the foreign affiliates of U.S. com- 
panies tend to be less diversified, on average, than the U.S. affiliates of foreign 
companies, because BEA allows no consolidation of  foreign affiliates across 
country or industry lines. Thus, the effect of  consolidation  on the data for 
foreign affiliates of U.  S.  companies is much less than that on the data for U. S . 
affiliates of foreign companies. 
The authors recommend that BEA not place high priority  on constructing 
market-value estimates of the direct investment position.  Nevertheless,  BEA 
has undertaken work in this area. Stekler and Stevens are correct in their as- 
sessment that survey methods are inappropriate for obtaining market values. 
Companies do not know the market value of  investments made in the past, 
unless  the  investments  have  been  sold  or recently  appraised. Even  if  ap- 
praised,  the value can vary significantly depending on the purpose of the ap- 
praisal.  Thus, indirect  methods of  estimating  market  values  are necessary. 
BEA published current value estimates of  the U.S. direct investment position 
abroad and foreign direct investment position in the United States, using in- 
direct methods, in the May 1991 Survey of  Current Business. 
The authors recommend that BEA collect more data for foreign parent com- 
panies. However, the reach of BEA’s legal authority to collect data stops at 
the U.S.  border.  BEA must collect the information from the foreign parent’s 
U.S. affiliate rather than from the foreign parent  itself.  Collection  of  some 
additional detail is possible. It is unlikely, however, that U.S. affiliates will be 
able to obtain highly detailed information from their foreign parents to report 
to BEA. 
As resources permit, BEA has made, is making, or planning to make, im- 
provements  in several areas not mentioned earlier. A layman’s guide for data 
users that explains the differences in the various direct investment data series 
and how to use them correctly was published in the February  1990 Survey of 
Current Business. BEA has received funding for 1991 and beyond to increase 
its compliance efforts to improve the coverage of  smaller investments, partic- 
ularly in real estate, and to strengthen its ability to analyze the data collected 
and to respond  to special requests  for information  on direct investment.  In 
addition, BEA is continuing to explore ways to lessen the suppression prob- 
lems in its published data and to publish the data on as timely a basis as pos- 
sible. 